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Federal Tax Treatment of Environmental Clean-Up
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CLEAN-UP COSTS: AN EVER CHANGING DOCTRINE
by Joan M. Swartz'
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades,
entities have been faced with an
increasing myriad of federal and state
environmental laws and regulations. It
has become routine for these entities,
small and large, to deal with
environmental issues in the regular course
of day-to-day operations. Managing
environmental liabilities involves
complicated issues regarding the
necessity and scope of clean-up which
can mean expenditures of hundreds of
thousands of dollars. In the many'
instances where extensive study and/or
clean-up is necessary. entities are
searching for ways to reduce or mitigate
the impact of clean-up costs. Some
taxpayers have attempted to deduct
environmental costs for federal income
tax purposes to reduce the effect of these
costs on the overall profitability of the
business. This article analyses the federal
income tax treatment of environmental-
related costs.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In recent years. the tax
treatment of expenditures incurred to
clean-up environmental contamination
has become a subject of public debate.
Initially. the Internal Revenue Service 2
adopted a restrictive approach to
analyzing whcher costs incurred for
various environmental clean-up activitics
would be deductible for federal income
tax purposes under Code Section 162.
The Service generally required taxpayers
to capitalize environmental costs under
Code Section 162 based on the rationale
that the clean-ups produced long-term
benefits. disqualifling an immediate tax
benefit to the taxpayer.
More recently. however the
Service has shown a greater willingness
to allow current deductions under certain
circumstances. For example. in Rev Ru/
94-38. the Service permitted a company
to deduct the costs to remediate soil at
its manufacturing plant which had
become contaminated as a result of the
company's own operations on-site. The
Service allowed the deductions as
ordinary and necessary expenses.
because the company acquired the
property in a clean condition and
contaminated the property in the course
of its business. With Rev. Rul. 94-38.
the Service implied an adoption of a
restoration principle. Under this
principle. environmental costs which
merely "restore" property to prior value.
rather than enhancing it, are deductible
as ordinary and necessary business
'Joan M. Swartz is a membcrof Lashlv&Baer. PC. in St. Louis. Missouri; A.B. 1984. St. LouisUniversity Political Scienceand History:
J.D. 1987, St. Louis University. She concentrates her practice on environmental issues. 'he author wishes to grateliilly acknowledge
Rhonda A. O'Brien, member Lashlyv&3aer. P.C.- 1.A. with distinction. 1977, Boston IUniversity:J.D. 1980, Southern IllinoisUniversityat
Carbondale: L.L.M. Taxation. 1989, Washington I niversity. Ms. O'Brien is a tax practitioner, her assistance has been invaluable.
2 Referred to hereinafter as the "Service".
'See, e.g. TAM 9315004, (12/17/92).
Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 seems to signifva shift in the position of the Service.
Section 162(a); Regs. §1.162-4 allows taxpayers to currentl deduct the cost of incidental repairs that neither materially add to the value of
the property nor appreciably prolong the life of the property.
6 Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
7 Notice 97-7, 1997-1 I.R.B. 8.
8 The procedure has not yet been finalized. An estimate by the Service is that the procedure will be final by the end ofStumner 1997. In the
meantime, the Service has issued Announcement 97-22, 1997-12 1.R.B. 47 (3/24/97) which allows any interested taxpayer the opportunity
to make a presubinission request regarding a transaction and its deductibility.
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The Service's application of the
restoration principal since Rev Rul. 94-
38 has been less than consistent. This
has caused both controversy and
conftsion among the taxpayers and their
advisors. However. just recently. the
Service issued Notice 97-71 providing a
procedure whereby a taxpayer can submit
a request for written guidance by the
Service on the federal income tax
ticatment ofenvironmental costs incurred
by the taxpayer. The ruling procedure is
designed by the Service to facilitate the
resolution of the issue of current
deductibility or capitalization of
environmental costs over a period of
years including future years in situations
involving one environmental clean-up
transaction. This procedure may be
invoked during a two-year trial period
beginning on the date that the proposed
revenue procedure is finalized.' Notice
97-7, and the to be issued revenue
procedure. is a breakthrough which will
provide certainty on the tax treatment
environmental clean-up costs under
Sections 162 and 263 of the Internal
Revenue Code (the "Code"). The Notice
indicates that the ruling request may
cover the treatment of costs incurred over
a period of years including future and
prior years (whether or not under
examination).
Requests for guidance may
involve continuing transactions. By
continuing transactions. the Service
means a series of events or transactions
making up one environmental clean-up
occurring over prior and future taxable
Vol. 4*No. 3
years. Taxpayers may request a letter
ruling that will cover all tax years in which
costs are incurred under the transaction.
even if they include years for which a
return has been filed. 9  Special
requirements apply to taxpayers tinder
examination or before an appeals office.
Environmental costs for purposes of the
ruling request procedure include any
costs associated with the assessment.
mitigation, or remediation of
enironmental hazards on the taxpayer's
property or the property of another.
Taxpayers may not request guidance
under this procedure if: (1) the entire
environmental clean-up transaction is
completed. and the time for filing returns
with extensions for all years covering the
transaction has expired: (2) the entire
environmental clean-up transaction is a
proposed transactiono; and (3) the
identical environmental clean-up issue is
in the taxpayer's return for an earlier
period and the issue is currently in
litigation in a case involing the taxpayer
or related taxpayer.
. Notice 97-7 is clearly an effort
by the Service to clarify the confusion
caused by its prior rulings on the issue of
deductibility of environmental clean-up
costs. In fact, Notice 97-7 provides that
prior to issuing a letter ruling, the Serice
will have the proposed letter ruling
reviewed by a member of its
environmental clean-up costs
specialization team. The review process
should result in more consistent rulings.
IH. GENERAL RULE
A. Ordinary and Necessary Repair vs.
Long-term Improvement
Although the debate over the
tax treatment of environmental
remediation costs has only developed
recently. it involves the long-standing tax
accounting problem of whether an
expenditure may be currently deducted
as a repair. or alternativ'ely must be
capitalized asan improvement. Generally
Code Section 162(a)" allows a taxpayer
to deduct all ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business. By contrast. Code Section
26312 requires that expenditures that
materially add to the value of the property
or appreciably prolong its useful life must
be capitalized. Code Section 263(a)(1)
provides that no deduction is allowed for
capital improvements to property. In
addition. Code Section 263(a)(2)
provides that no deduction is alloved for
any amount expended in restoring
property or making good the exhaustion
of property for which an allowance is or
has been made.4
Generally an expenditure will
be classified as a capital improvement
rather than a currently deductible repair
if it meets one of the three tests: (1) the
expenditure increases the useful life of
the property: (2) the expenditure adapts
the property to a new or more productive
use: or (3) the expenditure materially
increases the value of the property."
There are several tests for
determining whether an expenditure is a
currently deductible expense or capital
expenditure. but the basic difference is
one ofdegree, not kind. and thus a case-
by-case analysis is required." The reader
should note that deductible expense
treatment is the exception to the general
rule ofcapitalization.
B. Application of the General Rule
Rev Riu. 94-38m provides a
detailed analysis which is useful in
understanding how Sections 162 and 263
relate to the facts in a particular case and
affect the deductibility of environmental
costs. Rev. Rul. 94-38 involved a
corporation owning and operating a
manufacturing plant. The soil and
groundwater had been contaminated by
the corporation's own disposal of
hazardous waste. The corporation
sought to remediate the site and establish
a system for continued monitoring of
groundwater for traces of hazardous
chemicals. This action was necessary to
comply with then applicable federal. state
and local environmental requirements.
To implement the clean-up. the company
excavated the contaminated soil.
transported it to a waste disposal facility
and back-filled the excavated area with
clean soil. Soil remediation activities
took over two years to complete. The
corporation also constructed a
groundwater treatment facility including
wells. pipes. pumps and other equipment
to extract. treat and monitor the
contaminated groundwater. The
construction of the groundwater
treatment and monitoring facility began
at about the same time as the soil
remediation. but was planned to remain
in operation for approximately 12 years
to insure the elimination of hazardous
chemicals.
The company argued that the
overall effect of the soil remediation and
groundwater treatment program was to
Ordinarily, the Service limits letter nilings on income tax issues only to prospective transactions or completed transactions if the request is
made before the return is filed. But see Rev. Proc. 97-1, 1997-1 1.R.13. 11 (1/6/97) which provides a procedure for review of proposed
transactions in this situation.
'o Rev. Proc. 97-1, 1997-1 I.R.B. 11 (1/6/97) is applicable, a letter oiling is available under certain conditions set out therein.
" Il62(a); Regs. §1.1624.
12 §263(a); Regs. §263(aXl) statesno deduction shall be allowed forany amount paid out for new% buildings or for the pennanent improvement




"See Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333(1962), non-acq., 1964-2 C.B. 8.
Welch v. IHlelvering, 290 U.S. I I1(1933).
"See INDOPCO Inc. v. Conunissioner, 503 U.S. 79(1992).
"1l994-1 C.B. 35.
140 MELPR
Federal Tax Treatment of Environmental Clean-Up
restore the land to essentially the same
physical condition that existed prior to
the contamination. 9 Indeed. duringand
after the remediation and treatment the
company continued to operate the plant
in the same manner as it did prior to the
clean-up, except that all disposal of
hazardous chemicals was now in
compliance with applicable law.
Based on these facts, the
corporation sought to deduct all the costs
of remediation as ordinary and necessary
repairs. It argued that the appropriate
test for determining whether the
expenditures increased the value of
property is to compare the status of the
asset afler the expenditure with the status
of the asset before the condition arose
that necessitated the expenditure.
The Service has acknowledged
that even though a taxpayer may incur
an expense only once in the life of its
business. the expense may qualify as an
ordinary and necessary expense if it is
helpful in the carrying on of the business.
commonly and frequently incurred in the
type of business conducted by the
taxpayer, and not a capital expenditure. 0
In determining whether a
current deduction or capitalization is the
appropriate tax treatment for any
particular expenditure. it is important to
consider the extent to which the
expenditure will produce significant
future benefits.2' Applving this criteria.
the Service held in Reiv Rul. 94-38 that
the groundwater treatment facility
constructed by company had a useful life
substantially beyond the taxable year in
which that treatment facility was
constructed. Thus. the cost of
constructing the treatment facility was a
capital expenditure under Code Section
263. The company therefore required
capitalization of both the direct cost of
the treatment facility and the allocable
share of the indirect costs incurred in
constructing the groundwater treatment
facility.
In contrast the Service held
that remediation expenditures and on-
going groundwater treatment
expenditures (i.e. the groundwater
treatment expenditures other than the
expenditures to construct the treatment
facility) merely restored the company's
soil and groundwater to the condition
before they were contaminated by the
manufacturing operation. The Service
reasoned that these activities did not
produce permanent improvements to the
land within the scope of Code Section
263. or otherwise provide a significant
future benefit. The Service also reasoned
that these activitics did not increase the
value of or prolong the useful life of the
land. nor did they adapt the land to a new
or different use. As such, the soil
remediation and on-going groundwater
treatment expenditures were deemed
ordinary and necessary business expenses
within the scope of Code Section 162.
The Service viewed these expenditures
as appropriate and helpful in carrying out
the company's business. and commonly
required in such business.
C. Future Benefit
One of the essential questions
in determining whether an expenditure
qualifies for a current deduction or must
be capitalized is whether the taxpayer
realizesbenefits beyond the year in which
the expenditure is incurred. Thisprinciple
was enumerated by the United States
Supreme Court in INDOPCO, Inc. v
Conunissioner 4 In that case, the high
court held that expenses such as
investment banking. legal and othercosts
incurred in connection with a friendly
corporate acquisition were required to be
capitalized. The Court reasoned that the
taxpayer would realize significant benefits
beyond the taxable year of the
transaction. This case is cited by the
Service for the proposition that costs that
create future substantial future benefits
must be capitalized. 5
Rev. Rul. 94-38 is a good
example of the application of this
principle. The Service analyzed the type
of costs. and divided them depending
upon whether the benefits produced by
the expenditure extended beyond the year
in which the expense was incurred. For
example. in Rei. Ru. 94-38 the
groundwater treatment facilities were
found to have a useful life substantially
beyond the taxable year in which
constructed. Thus, the costs of
construction w'ere deemed capital
expenditures under Code Section
263(a)." By contrast, the soil
remediation expenditures and on-going
groundwater treatment expenditures did
not produce permanent improvement to
the land. The Service deemed the soil
remediation and on-going groundwater
treatment expenditures as activities which
did not result in improvements that
increased the value of the property. but
merely restored the soil and groundwater
to their approximate condition before
the, were contaminated by the taxpayer's
"Rev. Ril. 94-38.
2 The Service cites the following authorities for its position: Intemal Revenue Service v Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Depur it duPont. 308
U.S. 488 (1940); Welch ni Helvering, 290 U.S. III (1933).
2
'See IADOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79.
22§263(a); §1.263(a)(1).
23Revenue Ruling 94-38 was viewed as modification of Revenue Ruling 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36, to the extent it implied that the value test
applied by the Tax Court in Plainfield-Union cannot be an appropriate test in any case other than one in which there was sudden and unanticipated
damage to an asset.
25IADOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79.
2sMore recent developments indicate the Service may be adopting a more narrow viewofl\DOPCO. See, Capitalizcuion and Fruur Benefits:





D. Value, Use, Life Expectancy and
Capacity
The underpinnings forRev Rul.
94-38 are set out in Plainfield-UJnion
W'ater Co. v Conunissionern it is useful
to examine the case in order to
understand the Service's reasoning. In
Plainfield-Union. the taxpayer. a water
utility, incurred costs to clean and install
cement linings in 600 feet of water pipe.
The water main, installed in 1910 with
tar lining. had been designed to cany well
water. Due to changes in the nature of
the use of the water main, cleaning and
re-lining was necessary. The Service
contended that the expenditures should
have been capitalized because they
increased the value of the pipe. The
Court rejected the Service's contention,
explaining that any properly performed
repair adds value as compared with the
situation existing immediately prior to the
repair. The Court upheld the deduction
of the expenses, explaining that the
proper test was whether the expenditure
materially enhanced the value, use. life
expectancy, strength or capacity of the
asset as compared with the status of the
asset "prior to the condition necessitating
the expenditure."" Other taxpayers have
attempted to rely on the reasoning in
Plainfield-Union to justify current
deduction of environmental expenses as
ordinary and necessary expense to no
avail.? For example, in Technical Advice
Memorandum 924000411 the taxpayer
owned a manufacturing plant in which
the equipment was insulated with
asbestos containing materials. In
response to government regulation. the
taxpayer removed all asbestos containing
materials and replaced them with
alternative forms of insulation. The
replacement insulation was less thermally
efficient than the asbestos containing
insulation removed from the site. The
taxpayer argued. based on Plainfield-
Union. that to determine whether the
value was increased by the expenditure.
the proper comparison was not to the
value of the property immediately before
the expenditure. but rather to the value
of the property before the existence of
the condition necessitating the
expenditure.
The Service rejected the
taxpayer's arguments. The Service stated
that by removing the asbestos containing
materials from its plant. the taxpayer had
increased the value of its property since
it was now in compliance with
government regulations. Section 263
required the capitalization of any cost
associated wvith permanent improvements
or betterments. The Service
distinguished a "repair" as something not
a permanent cure but only a remedy for
immediate consequences.32 finding that
the cost to remove or replace the asbestos
containing materials should be
capitalized. The Service concentrated on
the fact that the asbestos abatement
program made the taxpayer's plant more
valuable by reducing or eliminating the
human health risk posed by asbestos
containing insulation. The effect ofTAM
9240004 has been to limit the use of
Plainfield-Union to facts where the
expenditure was necessitated by the
progressive deterioration of the
property."
Another Technical Advice
Memorandum issued by the Service in
1994 produced more favorable results for
taxpayers regarding asbestos
management. In TAM 9411002 the
taxpayer engaged in the sale of rental
warehouse space. Its warehouse facility
consisted of a warehouse building and
boiler house containing old heating
equipment. In order to secure financing
for expansion. the taxpayer was required
to abate asbestos from the warehouse and
boiler house. The taxpayer removed the
boilers and tanks contaminated by
asbestos, cleared the boiler house of all
other asbestos containing materials. and
repaired damaged asbestos insulation in
the warehouse. The taxpayer retained
an asbestos contractor to encapsulate
certain damaged areas and abate the
insulation too damaged to be rewrapped.
After all asbestos work was completed.
the taxpayer converted the boiler room
into a garage and office space. and rented
the olfice space to a tenant.14
The taxpayer deducted the
costs incurred in the asbestos abatement
activities in the warehouse and boiler
house as ordinary and necessary business
expense. relying on Plainfield- Union for
its position that the removal of asbestos
containing materials did not increase the
value of the property The TAM found
that the taxpaycr's clean-up expenditures
increased the value. the use. and the
capacity of the property as compared to
its original condition because the
expenditures permanently eliminated the
27d.
2839 TC. 333.
2939 T.C. at 338.
30See TAM 9240004, (6/29/92), TAM 9315004, and TAM 9411002, (11/19/93).
31TAM 9240004.
32See also Overman Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 471 (1967), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 3 and Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
United States, 558 F.2d 1379(Ct. Cl. 1977).
"There is a breadth of authority which support this notion: Teitelbaum v. Coniissioner, 294 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1961), ceiu. denied, 368 U.S.
987(1962Xcost ofconverting buildings electrical system from DC to AC to comply with city ordinance must be capitalized); RKO Theatres,
Inc. v. United States, 163 F.Supp. 598 (Ct. Cl. 1958)(cost of installing new exit from lire escaes to comply with city regulations must be
capitalized); Hotel Sugrave, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 619(1954)(cost of installing sprinkler system to comply with order ofcity building
department must be capitalized): Deaven v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. (CCI 1) 1344 (1947Xcost of converting from oil heat to coal heat because
war time oil conservation laws must be capitalized).
31TAM 9411002.
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health risk posed by the asbestos: made
the property more attractive to potential
buyers. investors, lenders and customers:
and enhanced property usefulness and
capacity by creating new office space. 5
The Service rejected the Plainfield-
Union argument. finding that since
asbestos was present at the time the
taxpayer purchased the property. the
asbestos removal costs did not merely
return the property to the state it was in
before the condition necessitating the
expenditures arose.
The Service. however. did
allow the taxpayer to deduct as ordinary
and necessary expenses all costs of
encapsulating asbestos containing
materials. The TAM provided that these
costs were deductible as incidental repair
costs because they neither increased the
value of the taxpayer's property nor
substantially prolonged its useful life. For
example, the wrapping of the pipe
insulation reduced. but did not eliminate.
the threat of exposure to airborne
asbestos fibers. Furthermore. the
taxpayer had a continuing obligation to
monitor asbestos containing materials
and re-encapsulate or remove insulation
if it became damaged. For these reasons,
the Service believed that encapsulation
expenditures did not enable the taxpayer




enunciated in Rev. Rul. 94-38 and
grounded in Plainfield-Union was the
focus of several more recent rulings. In
Technical Advice Memorandum
954100537, the taxpayer. a consolidated
group of corporations. purchased land
initially used for farming and later used
as a site for disposal of industrial waste.
planning to use it fora recreational park.
Upon discovery of the contamination. the
County re-deeded the land back to the
donor for $1.00. The donor recorded
the property as having a $1.00 tax basis
and did not recapture or adjust for the
charitable contribution deduction it had
taken.' The donor company entered into
a consent order with the Environmental
Protection Agency" for the purpose of
completing a Remedial Investigation and
Feasibility Study to determine the extent
ofthe contamination and to recommend
action necessary to remedy the condition.
Numerous expenses were incurred by the
company including consulting and
engineering fees and legal expenses
related to the negotiation and drafling of
an EPA consent order spelling out the
remediation requirements.
In TAM 9541005. the Service
concluded that the theory of deductibility
under Rev RuL. 94-38 applies only to
cases where the environmental
remediation expenditures restore
contaminated property to a previous
uncontaminated condition. The Service
interpreted the restoration principle
rigidly, applying it solely to situations
where a taxpayer acquires property in a
clean condition. contaminates the
property in the course of its own regular
business operations. and incurs costs to
restore the property to its former
condition. This requirement was not
satisfied because the donor (a subsidiary
of the former owner) acquired the
property in a contaminated condition
when it re-acquired it from the County
for $1.00. The Service held. without
significant discussion, that the taxpayer's
expenditures were not incurred in the
ordinary course of its business. It came
to this conclusion despite the fact that
The land was donated to the County the contamination occurred during the
"Id.
taxpayer's regular business operations.
TAM 9541005 has been widely
criticized by practitioners.40 The
Service's position that deductions may
be taken only if the taxpayer contaminates
the property itself is poor public policy.
Also. the break in taxpayer's ownership
for a brief period did not justify
disassociating the taxpayer from the
contaminating acts.
In the subsequent TAM
9627002,' the Service revoked TAM
9541005 and issued a new ruling that
allows the deduction of such costs under
these conditions. This reversal may
indicate new flexibility in applying Rev
Rul. 94-3 8. The revised TAM 9627002
explains that environmental assessment
costs are deductible under the theory of
Rev Rul. 94-38. notwithstanding the
break in ownership of the property. The
Service based its finding on the fact that
the same taxpayer contaminated the
property and incurred the environmental
costs, holding that the interim break in
ownership should not operate to disallow
a deduction under the general principles
of Code Section 162. The Service
determined that the costs were deductible
because they did not create or enhance
an asset, nor did they produce a long-
term benefit. The Service noted in TAM
9627002 that the contamination of land
and the taxpayer's liability for
remediation were unchanged during the
break in ownership based on generally
accepted interpretations of
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980.2
The Serice also explained that
its holding in TAM 9541005 that
assessment costs were not incurred in the
ordinary course of the taxpayer's business




3 The land was eventually classified as a Superfluind site under the provisions of the Comprehensive and Enviromnental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq.
"H ereafter referred to as "EPA".
40See, e.g., TL Treatment of Environnental Clean-up Costs: The Debate Continues, 37 TAx MVANAGEMENT MEMO 131 (1996) and Rubin,
Witt and Rosefsky, Tax Treatment ofEnvironnental Clean-up Costs, NYU 54TH INST1l1JTE ON FED. TAx, § 11 (1996).
41TAM 9627002, (7/5/96).
4242 U.S.C. §9607 clearly states that present and past owners are within a class ofliable persons for environmental ha7ards created on property,
whether or not the past owuers retain an interest in the property
MELPR 143
Vol. 4*No. 3
absence of proof regarding the amount
and purpose of the costs. The District
Director, in its request for
reconsideration, advised the National
Office that it did not dispute the amount
and purpose of the cost.
The Service's change in heart
may be based on the narrow issue of
ownership. However, the revocation of
TAM 9541005 may also indicate a
greater willingness by the Service to
apply Rev Rul. 94-38 in a broader
manner.
F. Extension of the Restoration
Principle
The Service's position that the
break in ownership should not affect the
deductibility of clean-up and associated
costs is in keeping with another authority,
Rev Ru!. 95-74." In that controversy,
the Service held that a subsidiary which
receives contaminated property in a Code
Section 3511 exchange stands in the
shoes of the parent for purposes of
determining whether clean-up costs
should be capitalized. In Rev Rul. 95-
74 a parent corporation formed a
subsidiary, and transferred to the
subsidiary substantially all the assets of a
manufacturing business in exchange for
all the subsidiary's stock. The transferred
land had been bought by the parent in
clean condition and was contaminated by
the parent's manufacturing operation.
Before the Code Section 351 transfer. the
parent did not take any steps to cure the
contamination, nor had the parent
deducted or capitalized any
environmental clean-up costs. The
subsidiary assumed all the environmental
liabilities of the manufacturing business,
including its liabilities for potential soil
and groundwater contamination. The
subsidiary also incurred the cost to
remediate the contamination of the
transferred land. Under the principles
discussed in this article. part of the costs
would have been deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expense. and part
of the cost would have been required to
be capitalized by the parent, if the parent
had not transferred the property to the
subsidiary The Service dctermined that
the subsidiary stood in the parent's shoes
with regard to environmental liability.
allowing the subsidiary to deduct some
costs and requiring it to capitalize other
costs.
In rendering Rev Ru/. 95-74 the
Service refused to follow an Eighth
Circuit decision with similar facts.
Holdcroft Transportation Co. v.
Comnissioner." The Court held in that
case that transferor's liabilities. after a
transfer under the predecessor to Code
§35 1. were not deductible by transferee
even though they would have been
deductible by the transferor. The Court
viewed the expense as part of the cost of
acquiring the transferor's property. rather
than an operating expense or business
loss of transferee. In declining to follow
the Eighth Circuit's lead in Rev Rul. 95-
74. the Service said that the Eighth
Circuit's approach was inconsistent with
Congress' intent that Code §351 facilitate
business reorganization by permitting a
subsidiary to deduct costs otherwise
deductible by the parent. Rev Rul. 95-
74 also adopts a more flexible approach
to the restoration principle.
IV. LEGAL FEES AND OTHER
COSTS
The question of whether legal
fees and other environmental costs are
deductible under Code §162 or must be
capitalized under Code §263 is
determined by applying the "origin of the
claim doctrine".1 Applying this doctrine.
the taxpayer must examine the nature of
the matter giving rise to the need for legal
representation. Generally. if the
underlving matter is a deductible expense.
the legal fees and costs will be considered
deductible. However. if the costs are
related to a capital improvement. the%,
must be capitalized.
In Rei. Ru/. 80-245". the
Service held that the costs of an
environmental impact study are
deductible under Section 162 of the Code
unless chargeable to a capital account.
The Service allowed costs incurred by a
public utility for environmental impact
studies to support an application to state
regulators for expansion of the utility to
be deducted under Code Section 162.48
These costs were deemed ordinary and
necessary expenses.
In TAM 9627002.41 the Service
advised that legal and consulting fees
incurred for environmental clean-up are
currently deductible under the theories
set forth in Rev. Rul. 94-38. With TAM
9627002, the Service withdrew the
controversial TAM 95410050. denying
a taxpayer a current deduction for legal
and consulting fees related to the
assessment of contaminated property.
Reversing its position..the Service
concluded that the taxpayer may rely on
Rev Ru. 94-38 to deduct environmental
assessment and related legal expenses as
ordinary and necessary business expenses
under Code § 162.51
4 1995-46 I.R.B. 6.
"Code §351 penuits property transfers to coqorations in exchange for stock Nihere the transferors, afler the exchange, control the corporation.
11 53 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946).
4
'United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
47l980-2 C.B. 72.
48The Service distinguished these types ofexpenses from research and development expenses. which are deductible under Section 174. Rev.
Rul. 80-245, 1980-2 C.B. 72.
49See, Section C.5, supra at 37-42, for a more complete discussion of TAMs 9541005 and 9627002.
'See also TAM 9315004, (12/17/92) riecting taxpayer's argument that legal fees, environmental assessment costs, remediation costs and
government oversight costs are ordinary and necessary expenses. Instead, the Service niled these costs should be capitalized because. by
bringing the property into compliance with the current law, the taxpayer avoided penalties and increased the marketability of its property.
"For more detailed discussion, See. Enwinmnental Renu'diclion Erpenses.Vot Deductible 11k mien Pmipery.-lcquin'd in Contaminated
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Although TAM 9627002 is
promising for current deductibility of
these costs, the taxpayer is cautioned that
the deductibility of any given legal fees
and other environmental costs (such as
the cost of assessment and cost to design
remediation) should be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Certainly, the analysis
must include an examination of the nature
of the matter giving rise to the need for
legal representation. Also. the analysis
is very similar to the analysis for
determining whether a deduction is
considered an ordinary and necessary
business expense or a capital
improvement.
V. FINES AND PENALTIES
Consistent with other sections
of the Code, fines and penalties paid by a
taxpayer for environmental damages are
not deductible." InAlliedSignallnc. v
Commnissioner,5 the taxpayer, a
manufacturer of chemical pesticides. was
fined $13 million dollars for
environmental damage. A portion of the
fine ($8 million) was paid to an
environmental fund and the remainder
was paid as a "fine". The taxpayer
attempted to deduct its $8 million dollar
contribution as an ordinary and necessary
business expense. The corporation
claimed that the contribution was made
at its discretion and was not imposed by
the District Court. The Court held that
the contribution was involuntary because
it was actually part of an overall fine.
Also. the Court found that the
contribution was punitive in nature
because it was a way of avoiding a higher
fine. The Court held that the $8 million
dollar contribution to the environmental
endowment fund was not deductible as
an ordinary and necessary business
expense under Code Section 162(a). but
rather was a fine or similar penalty paid
to the government for violation of law
pursuant to Code Section 162(f).
Similarly. in Colt Industries v
United States." the taxpayer paid $1.6
million to the State Clean Air and Clean
Water Funds in satisfaction of civil
penalties imposed by a consent decree
between the taxpayer and the EPA. Colt
claimed an ordinary business expense
deduction for the $1.6 million dollar
payment under Section 162(a). The
Service disallowed the deduction on the
basis that the payments constituted a fmne
or civil penalty under Code Section
162(f). The Court pointed out that Colt
has conceded that the payments at issue
were civil penalties, indeed the payments
were so designated in the consent decree
and the inscription on the check remitted
in satisfaction ofthe penalty noted "EPA
penalty". 6 Thus. the Court found that.,
by the taxpayer's own admission. the
amount paid by the taxpayer was part of
the negotiated settlement of threatened
litigation under the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts.
Distinguished from the breadth
ofauthority regarding fines and penalties
is S & B Restaurant v. Connissioner."
In that case. the Court held that monthly
payments to the State's Clean Water Fund
were not fines or similar penalties within
the meaning of Section 162(f). and were
deductible under Section 162(a).
Petitioner had operated a motel. whereby
it discharged a significant amount of raw
sewage directly underground. The
company entered into an agreement with
the State of Pennsylvania in which it
agreed to connect to and discharge into
the sanitary sewer system of the
township. and to donate a sum per month
to the Clean Water Fund of the State until
a sanitary system was created by the
State. The company paid into the Fund
over a two-year period. After entering
into the agreement, it continued to
discharge raw sewage directly
underground. Neither the State nor any
municipality provided treatment of the
discharged raw sewage. but the State
would have sought to prevent petitioner
from constructing its own treatment
facility.
The question before the Court
was whether the payments to the Clean
Water Fund were fines or penaltiesw ithin
the meaning of Code Section 162(f). The
Court. after reviewing the record. was
satisfied that the payments in question
were in furtherance of State laws to
control pollution through consolidated
rather than individual facilities. So, it
found that the payments made by the
company were for the license to discharge
its waste. rather than a fine or penalt.
The Court recognized that the agreement
between the company and the State
included a provision that the State would
not charge the company for any violations
of State law. But the Court viewed this
Condition, 36 TAN MGMT. MEMo 340 (11/13/95). compat Deduction of Envionmental .lssessmen Costs Pernitted as IRS Withdraws
Controversial 7'f 9541005, 37 IAX MGMT MEo 13 (3/18/96).
12§ 162(f); Reg. § 1.162-21(b) which states that fines or similar penalties paid to the govennent for violation ofthe law is not deductible, but
the non-deductible fine or penalty does not include the cost of defending against prosecution or a civil suit.
5 354 F.3d 167 (3rd Cir. 1995).
"See also Tank Tmick Rentals nv v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30.35-36 (1958)(Supremc Court observing that courts have unifonuly held that
pennitting deductions for tines would frustrate public policy by reducing the "sting"of the penalty); Waldman v. Commissioner, 850 F.2d 611
(9th Cir. 1988Xpayment was considered a tine or similar penalty because the sentencing court ordered payment of restitution by defendant);
Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (2nd Cir. 1990)(payment was a non-deductible line under Code Section 162(f) because payment was
made as a result of a criminal conviction and it was ordered in lieu ofan additional prison tenn). Bailey v. Connissioner, 756 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.
1985Xcivil penalty applied in settlement ofclass action pursuant to court order and not deductible under Section 162(f)).
"880 F.2d 1311 (Ct. Cl. 1989).
6Id. at 1313.
5773 T.C. 1226 (1980).
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as merely incidental to the main purpose
of the agreement, which was to insure
that the petitioner would join a municipal
disposal system and not build its own
sanitary sewer system.
The analysis in these three cases
focused on the underlying intent of the
payment, not how the payment was
labeled or to what entity the payment was
made. The central issue in determining
whether fines or penalties can be
deducted is whether the payment was
intended to be punitive in nature. In
AlliedSignal and Colt the courts found
the intent of the regulatory agency was
to punish the taxpayer. In contrast, in
S&BRestaurant the Court believed that
while the payments resolved the
environmental dispute between the
parties. they were not punitive in nature.
VI. CONCLUSION
As discussed in this article, the
principles by which an expense is
analyzed to determine whether it is
deductible or capitalized for federal
income tax purposes have become
clearer. These principles include the
general rule for determining whether an
expense is an ordinary and necessary
expense or capital in nature. If the
expense merely restores property to its
former condition it can be argued that it
is an ordinary expense.
Even though the standards have
become clearer, the determination of
whether the expense fits into the
deductible category or capitalized
category is still difficult to make because
it is fact dependent. The Service has
come a long way in recognizing the
difficulty in making a decision which will
withstand audit. by providing an
opportunity for taxpayers to step forward
and request private letter rulings on
deductibility. This opportunity is
described in Notice 97-7 and
Announcement 97-22. Hopefully. the
rulings issued by the Service under these
procedures will be published as private
letter rulings. While these private letter
rulings will not be officially useful as
precedents. they will provide greater
guidance for taxpayers and their
representatives.
As discussed throughout this
article. it appears that the Service is
leaning in the direction of allowing
current deductibility in a greater number
of instances. If the trend does indeed
continue, it should provide a small dose
of incentive towards prompt clean-up of
environmentally damaged properties.
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